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Abstract 
Nowadays, many websites have adopted the Really 
Simple Syndication (RSS) technology to deliver online 
content to visitors. In this paper, I build an analytical 
model to examine how the offering of RSS feeds impact 
the number of visitors, total traffic load, and profit of 
websites in a competitive setting. I show that although 
RSS can always attract more visitors, it may reduce the 
websites profit. Interestingly, in a competitive market 
there are cases that the RSS feeds hurt the offering 
website but benefit the competing website instead. The 
conditions under which these will happen are derived. 
I also study the simultaneous RSS-adoption game and 
show that different equilibrium outcomes will appear 
under different parameter combinations. Applying my 
findings to the practice, I suggest that offering RSS 
feeds could become a competitive disadvantage, and 
that certain types of websites, such as websites 
providing free content, should not offer RSS feeds.   
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The Internet has dramatically changed the quantity 
and range that information could be spread and 
exchanged. Nowadays, a tremendous amount of 
information is accessible to users across the globe via 
the World Wide Web. It brings on the contingent 
problem of "information overloading." It is not an easy 
task for users to find their interested content in face of 
such an information explosion. To locate useful 
information, a web user bears costs of searching among 
and within websites. Meanwhile, during the search, the 
user also bears costs of downloading and viewing 
unwanted advertisements such as online banners, pop-
ups, and sponsorships. These costs could be significant 
([2], [7], [13]). On the other hand, the information 
explosion also brings difficulties to websites. It 
becomes much harder for websites to identify and 
access their target users who are globally distributed, 
as well as to deliver the online content to these target 
users in an effective way. Competition among websites 
becomes more intensive. Competing websites often 
provide the similar or exactly same content and 
services, and they are just one-click away. How to 
distinguish themselves from competitors, attract fresh 
users and retain existing ones in the Internet is much 
more challenging than in any other industry. 
Really Simple Syndication (RSS) technology has 
emerged as a solution. It serves as a content delivery 
mechanism for websites as well as an information 
aggregator and filter for visitors. Using RSS, a website 
can push their content directly to potential web 
visitors. In order to do so, the website needs to create 
RSS feeds attached to its content. The official RSS 
icon is a square with rounded corners, usually orange, 
indicating RSS or XML. Once visitors select their 
interested feeds, the RSS program starts to work. It 
collects information from multiple websites, informs 
the visitor of latest updates periodically, and leads the 
visitor to the full content simply by clicking the 
attached link. Painful searching process is skipped; 
uninterested content and unwanted advertisements are 
filtered out ([8]).  
Websites respond to this new technology 
enthusiastically. By June 2005, 30% of all consumer 
media sites have already been providing their content 
via RSS feeds ([3]). For example, CNN.com offers free 
RSS feeds in XML format, the so-called RSS 
Content, to its visitors 
(http://edition.cnn.com/services/rss/). These feeds 
include news story headlines, summaries and links 
back to the CNN site for the full article. Yahoo! has 
added feeds to its customizable My Yahoo! Pages; and 
Google took steps to follow suit with the introduction 
of its customizable home page ([10]). Industry data 
have shown that providing RSS feeds does attract more 
visitors to a website. According to the New York 
Times press release, RSS feeds generate 5.9 million 
page views for their site in March 2005, which 
represents a 342% increase over the previous year 
([14]). News Yahoo! reported that adding RSS feeds 
into My Yahoo! attracted 26 million additional visitors 
in April 2005. Intrigued by the increase in the number 
of page views and visitors, websites are offering RSS 
feeds at an even faster speed. Feedster, an RSS search 
engine, claims that the number of RSS feeds carried by 
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it has skyrocketed to 8.2 million in July 2005 from less 
than 1 million in November 2004 ([10]).  
Despite the rapid adoption of RSS, some important 
issues remain unsolved. First, although providing RSS 
feeds seems to attract more visitors, it is still unclear 
whether such increase in visitors can contribute to a 
proportional increase in profit. McLaws, Google's RSS 
advertising pilot, says that in his blog site "98 percent 
of the traffic originates from the RSS feeds." He 
complains that the RSS feeds are a bandwidth killer, 
and he is not able to monetize the site or take care of 
server costs ([1]). The second question is that as more 
and more websites are starting to offer RSS feeds, will 
the adoption still bring competitive advantages for a 
site?  Researchers have shown that there are no 
absolutes as far as draw-backs and benefits when 
adopting a new technology or strategy. One example is 
the software third-party add-ins. Although add-ins 
enhances the functionality of the base product, it may 
increase or decrease the profit of the base software 
producer, depending on how consumers value the add-
ins ([4]). Another example is online customization 
strategy, which could be used as a price discrimination 
tool for sellers to gain higher profits. However, Dewan, 
Jing, and Seidmann ([6]) show that in a simultaneous 
adoption game, the two competing firms face a 
prisoner's dilemma choice. It is not necessarily optimal 
to adopt such a strategy in a competitive market. 
Similarly, the profitability of RSS feeds should also be 
investigated. Offering RSS feeds creates a new visit 
channel to web visitors. When the conventional direct 
visit and RSS visit channels coexist, how would they 
affect and compete with each other? In literature, 
channel and product-line cannibalization has been 
found in many scenarios ([11], [12]). The coexistence 
of multiple delivery channels or products may have 
strong cannibalization effects and eventually lead to a 
lower profit for the provider. In the RSS scenario, will 
this happen?  
In this work, I construct an analytical model to 
answer these above research questions. I study the 
impact of RSS adoption for websites in the competitive 
setting. To my best knowledge, this is the first paper 
studying the economic aspects of the RSS technology, 
which contributes to guide the RSS adoption from a 
novel angle. My analysis shows that offering RSS 
feeds, though always leading to a higher traffic load, 
may reduce the adopting websites own profit but 
increase the competitors profit. The RSS use hence 
constitutes a competition disadvantage, rather than 
advantage. In the paper, I derive the conditions under 
which it will happen. In addition, I show that the RSS 
adoption strategy largely depends on the profit 
structure of websites. For example, websites who offer 
free content (such as weblogs) or whose revenue 
mainly comes from advertising (such as most news 
portals) should not offer RSS, while websites who gain 
high sales income from visitors online consumption 
(such as e-commerce sites) should adopt the RSS.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
describes the model. Section 3 studies the website 
competition. Then I analyze the impact of RSS 
adoption on the competition outcome in Section 4, and 
the adoption equilibrium in Section 5. Section 6 
extends the model analysis. The last section 7 
summarizes major findings and discusses their 
business implications. 
 
2. The model  
 
Consider a website providing two types of content: 
general content and specific content.1  
General content provides web visitors with a brief 
and comprehensive information summary. Such 
information is free and easy to locate; in many cases it 
is posted on the home page. Visitors value general 
content differently. Some people enjoy browsing 
websites, and therefore gain higher utility from reading 
the general content; others are more like "serious 
information seekers, who have a strong prior on what 
they are interested in and thus obtain lower utility from 
viewing unrelated general information. To capture 
this natural difference of visitor population, I assume 
that a visitor's value from browsing the general 
content, denoted by x , follows uniform distribution in 
the range of ],0[ a : x ~ ],0[ aU .  
Specific content offers detailed information in a 
specific category or area. In order to access it, a visitor 
needs to spend time and efforts to search enough pages 
on the site. Consuming his interested content brings a 
value b  to the visitor; meanwhile, such consumption 
contributes to the website income. Depending on the 
website type, the income may take different forms and 
have different names. For instances, on e-commerce 
websites, it could the business profit from a visitor's 
online product purchase or service consumption; on 
news portals, which may charge visitors for their 
access to certain specific content, it is so called the 
"view-by-pay" charge. Regardless of the website type, 
it measures a visitor's non-advertising value to the 
website.  In this paper, I use a uniform name sales 
income (per visitor) and denote it by the parameter 
p .  
In the traditional way, visitors log on to the 
website, browse the general content, search through a 
number of pages, and eventually locate and consume 
                                                 
1 The ratio of the two types of content could be arbitrary. 
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the specific content of interests. I call them direct 
visitors."  
A direct visitor incurs three types of costs: 
(1) Searching cost S : a direct visitor has to search 
enough pages on the site before reaching his interested 
content. 
(2) Traffic cost ρw : a visitor incurs disutility when 
the website is busy. He suffers because the heavy 
traffic could cause problems such as the slower 
delivery speed of web pages, deteriorated content 
quality, or even delivery failure. These constitute the 
traffic cost of a visitor. Traffic cost is increasing in the 
total traffic load on the website which is denoted by ρ , 
and w  is the constant parameter. The calculation of 
ρ  will be discussed in details later. 
(3) Anti-advertising cost adC : most websites have a 
variety of online advertisements on them, such as pop-
ups and banners. Although advertisements could be 
effectively used as a way of signaling unobservable 
product quality to potential customers (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1986), downloading and viewing 
advertisements impose extra costs on visitors. They 
take longer time to load online and require efforts to 
view (Hoque and Lohes 1999); too many 
advertisements could even repel visitors (Dewan, 
Freimer, and Zhang 2002). In the paper, I denote the 
costs, on the visitors side, associated with viewing 
advertisements by adC , and call it a visitors anti-
advertising cost.2 
Hence, I can write the utility function of a direct 
visitor as ρwCSpbxU adD −−−−+= , where 
the lower subscript D indicates a direct visitor. 
If the website provides RSS feeds on its specific 
content, a visitor may go to the site in a different way. 
The visitor does not need to search the site to locate 
this specific content. Instead, he is led to the right 
location directly by the RSS program. I call him an 
"RSS visitor." RSS visitors skip browsing general 
content and only visit the page with specific content. 
They therefore do not incur searching costs. In 
addition, the RSS software program works to block 
online advertisements. Visitors therefore save the costs 
of downloading and viewing unwanted advertisements. 
However, they still bear the same amount of traffic 
costs as direct visitors.  
The utility function for an RSS visitor is 
                                                 
2 It does not matter what type of advertising income a website gains. 
It could be by per impression or by click-through rate or any other 
forms. For the modeling purpose, the only thing needed is that the 
existence of online advertisements does cause disutility for visitors.  
ρwpbUR −−= .3    
Similarly, I use the lower subscript R  to indicate 
an RSS visitor.  
The website gains both advertising as well as sales 
incomes, and bears site maintenance costs. Its profit 
function takes the following form 
ρπ *** cNpNA D −+=           (1) 
I use N , DN , and RN  to denote the total 
number of visitors, the number of direct visitors, and 
the number of RSS visitors respectively. The total 
number of visitors (N ) is the proxy for the market 
size. The parameter A  is the website's unit advertising 
income (per visitor), p  is its unit sales income (per 
visitor). The first term in equation (1) is the website's 
total advertising income. Direct visitors ( DN ) 
contribute to the advertising income. They, to some 
extent, are forced to download and view online 
advertisements when browsing and searching web 
pages, which increases the probability of gaining 
advertisement income for the site. However, unlike 
direct visitors, RSS visitors are not significant 
contributors to the sites advertising income because 
most RSS software can effectively block online 
advertisements. 4 The second term in equation (1) is the 
site's sales income. All visitors contribute to this part 
(N = DN + RN ). The last term is the website's total 
maintenance costs, which is the marginal maintenance 
cost c  multiplied by the traffic load of the site, ρ . 
Direct and RSS visitors visit the website in distinct 
ways, so they impose different traffic loads on the site. 
Direct visitors search the site and therefore download 
and visit a number of pages. I normalize the traffic load 
imposed by one direct visitor to be 1. RSS visitors skip 
the search process and visit the pages with specific 
content. They therefore impose less traffic load, which 
is assumed to be a fraction of θ , 1<θ . Hence, a 
website's total traffic load can be decomposed as 
RD NN θρ +=                        (2) 
In addition, I make the following assumption: 
SCbapawSCb adad −−+≤≤−−− . If the 
left inequality is violated, the website will always 
                                                 
3 Note that a visitor will derive different net values depending on 
which channel he is from ( RU from the RSS channel and DU  
from the direct visit).  
4 Although there is debate going on that websites should add 
advertisements into their RSS feeds, the actions are not taken by 
many websites yet. For example, CNN.com restricts advertisements 
in RSS. It claims that the incorporation of advertising into or the 
placement of advertising associated with or targeted towards the RSS 
Content, are strictly prohibited.  
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attract all potential visitors (a fully-covered market); if 
the right inequality is violated, the website will get no 
visitor at all. Both cases are trivial. 
 
3. Competition between websites  
 
Two websites, A and B, compete with each other. 
They have the same profit structure, given by equation 
(1). I analyze four cases one by one: Case <0,0>: both 
websites do not offer RSS feeds; Cases <1,0> and 
<0,1>: one website offers RSS feeds and the other does 
not;  and Case <1,1>: both websites offer RSS feeds. 
 
3.1. Case <0,0>: both websites do not offer RSS  
 
In Case <0,0>, there is no RSS. In equilibrium, the 
two websites must have the same traffic load: 
><><
=
0,00,0
BA ρρ .5 Otherwise, visitors will switch from 
the website with higher traffic load to the website with 
lower traffic load until the equivalence is reached.  
 
The marginal visitor gets zero net utility from 
visiting the website. Suppose this marginal visitor 
gains a value of 0,0x   from browsing general 
content. It then must satisfy  
0)( 0,00,00,0 =−−−−+= ><><>< iadD wCSpbxxU ρ , 
BorAi = .                           (3) 
I construct the following two variables: M and 
K .  
awCSpbM ad −−−−= ; 
adCSK += . 
The variable M is the minimal utility from direct 
visit, which is the (negative) utility obtained by the 
direct visitor who has zero value from general content 
and when the website is most crowded (i.e., a=ρ ). 
Its value is always negative. The variable K measures 
a visitors total cost saving from using the RSS.  
                                                 
5 In the paper, I will use the upper subscript to indicate the case, and 
the lower subscript indicates the website (A or B).  
Since websites A and B equally share the market, 
their traffic load is  ( ) 2/0,00,00,0 ><><>< −== xaBA ρρ .                                                    
Solve the equilibrium, I get  
2/1
2/0,0
w
awSpCbx ad
+
++++−
=
>< .              (4)                                 
( )
w
SpCba
xaN adii
+
−−−+
=−==
><><><
2
2/0,00,00,0ρ , 
BAi ,= .                                                     (5) 
w
cpAawMacpANii
+
−+++
=−+= ><><
2
))(()(0,00,0π
BAi ,= .                                      (6) 
 
3.2. Case <0,1>, <1,0>: one website offers RSS 
 
Without loss of generality, I look at the case 
<1,0>: website A offers RSS while B does not. Note 
that although the two websites here are 
heterogeneous in terms of their respective visit 
channels, the rule of "equal traffic load still holds in 
equilibrium. Otherwise, some direct visitors will 
switch from the site with higher traffic load to the site 
with lower traffic load until the equivalence is reached.   
Potential visitors now have two decisions to make: 
which website to visit and which visit channel to take. 
They first make the channel choice, and then the 
website choice. In other words, the competition 
between visit channels (RSS or direct visit) precedes 
the competition between websites (A or B). Denote the 
visitor who is indifferent between the two channels by 
>< 0,1x , where >< 0,1x  indicates this visitors value from 
general content browsing. As in Figure 1(b), visitors in [ ]ax ,0,1 ><  log to websites A or B directly. Assume 
that website A captures r  percent of direct visitors and 
B captures r−1  of them. There is no cutting-off 
interface between A's direct visitors and B's. Among 
those in [ ]>< 0,1,0 x , there are >< 0,1RN  RSS visitors. 
They visit website A through an RSS program. The 
rest ( ><>< − 0,10,1 RNx ) stay out of the market.  
Direct visitors, 
either to website 
A or B 
Visitors value from 
browsing general 
content 
a>< 0,0x0  
Do not visit any 
website (out of 
the market) 
Figure 1(a). The competition without RSS  
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Website B has only direct visitors. Its traffic load 
is ( )><><>< −−== 0,10,10,1 )1( xarNBBρ . Website A 
attracts ( )><− 0,1xar  direct visitors and >< 0,1RN  RSS 
visitors. Therefore, the traffic load and total number of 
visitors to A are ( ) ><><>< +−= 0,10,10,1 RA Nxar θρ , ( ) ><><>< +−= 0,10,10,1 RA NxarN , and 
><>< < 0,10,1 AA Nρ . 
The following equations (7) ~ (10) characterize the 
equilibrium.  
><><><
−−−−+=−− 0,10,10,1 BadA wCSpbxwpb ρρ    (7)                      ( ) ( ) ><><><><>< =−−=+−= 0,10,10,10,10,1 )1( BRA xarNxar ρθρ  (8) 
00,1 =−− ><Awpb ρ             (9) 
00,1 >><RN                          (10) 
Equation (7) describes the channel competition 
and defines the indifferent visitor; (8) states the rule of 
equal traffic load; (9) shows that in equilibrium an RSS 
visitor gains zero utility; and (10) states that at least 
some visitors will use the RSS channel.  
I solve the above equations (7) ~ (10), and get: 
)(
1
Kaw
pbr
−
−
−= ;    
KSCx ad =+=
>< 0,1 ;    
θθ w
arwpbrKNR
++−
−=
>< 0,1 .       (11)     
Condition (10) requires that the cost saving from 
the RSS approach must be high enough to attract some 
visitors to use the RSS:  
rw
arwSpCbK ad
+
++++−
>
1 .              (12) 
The above inequality (12) is the non-degeneration 
condition for Case <1,0>. When it is violated, Case 
<1,0> degenerates to Case <0,0>. In other words, 
although the site A offers the RSS channel, due to the 
small cost savings, no visitor will take it. 
Lemma 1 In the competition between a website with 
RSS (website A) and without RSS (website B), 
><><><><><>< ≥===≥ 0,1,
0,1
,
0,10,10,10,1
ADBDBBAA NNNN ρρ . 
The first and last equalities hold if and only if 
degeneration happens, namely, 
rw
arwSpCbK ad
+
++++−
≤
1
.  
Note that the same level of traffic load can "hold" 
more RSS visitors than direct visitors because each 
RSS visitor contributes to the traffic load by 1<θ . 
Hence, the rule of equal traffic load means that website 
A (with RSS) has a larger number of visitors than 
website B (without RSS). In addition, from equation 
(8), it is easy to see 
2
1
<r , which means that website 
B serves the majority of direct visitors. Based on these 
observations, I can further conclude that the RSS 
adopter may or may not gain higher profit in the 
competition with a non-adopter. 
Proposition 1 In the competition between a website 
with RSS and without RSS, there is a threshold 
value >< 0,1p  such that when the sales income per 
visitor ><> 0,1pp  the website with RSS gains higher 
profit. Otherwise, the website without RSS gains 
higher profit. This threshold value >< 0,1p  is the 
smaller positive root of the following equation: 
)(/))(12(
))(21(
pbrKKar
AKarp
−++−−
−−
=
θ
. 
 
3.3. Case <1,1>: both websites offer RSS 
 
The equilibrium market segmentation is showed in 
Figure 1(c). The visitor >< 1,1x  is indifferent between 
the two visit channels. All visitors in [ ]ax ,1,1 ><  are 
direct visitors, among which 1r  percent of them go to 
website A and 11 r−  percent go to website B. There is 
no cutting-off interface between A's direct visitors and 
B's. In the interval of [ ]>< 1,1,0 x , there are in total 
>< 1,1
RN  RSS visitors and the rest (
><><
−
1,11,1
RNx ) 
stay out of the market. These RSS visitors are shared 
by both websites: 2r  percent of them go to website A 
and 21 r−  percent go to B.  
)( 0,1 ><− xa  direct 
visitors: r  percent of 
them visit website A and  
r−1  percent of them 
visit website B.   
 
 
Visitors value from 
browsing general 
content 
a>< 0,1x  0  
In this segment, there are 
>< 0,1
RN  RSS visitors, who 
visit website A. The rest 
( ><><
−
0,10,1
RNx ) stay out of 
the market (do not visit any 
website). 
 
Figure 1(b). The competition between 
websites with and without RSS  
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Following equations characterize the equilibrium. 
Equation (13) describes the rule of equal traffic load; 
equation (14) defines the indifferent visitor >< 1,1x ; 
equation (15) shows that an RSS visitor gains zero 
utility in equilibrium; and equation (16) is the non-
degeneration condition which assures a positive 
numbers of RSS visitors. 
><><><
><><><
=−+−−=
+−=
1,11,1
2
1,1
1
1,1
2
1,1
1
1,1
)1())(1(
)(
BR
RA
Nrxar
Nrxar
ρθ
θρ
  (13) 
><><><
−−−−+=−− 1,11,11,1 iAi wCSpbxwpb ρρ , 
BAi ,=                                 (14) 
01,1 =−− ><iwpb ρ , BAi ,=                 (15) 
01,1 >><RN                                                    (16) 
Solving these equations, I get: 
       Kx =>< 1,1 ;  
θθ w
awpbKN R
++−
−=
>< 221,1 ;   
w
pb
BA
−
==
><>< 1,11,1 ρρ .          (17) 
2/1
2/
w
awSpCbK ad
+
++++−
>         (18) 
Asymmetric equilibriums could exist as long as 1r  
and 2r  satisfy the relation of 
)22)(21())(12( 21 w
awpbKrKar ++−−−=−− . 
This relation equation implies that ⇔>
2
1
1r  2
1
2 <r  
and vice versa. Obviously, 
2
1
21 == rr  satisfies this 
equation and gives out the symmetric equilibrium. The 
set of solutions derived here works for both 
asymmetric and symmetric equilibriums. Equation (18) 
is the non-degeneration condition for Case <1,1>.  
Each websites' profit is given by 
cpNAN iiiDi
><><><><
−+= 1,11,11,1,
1,1 ρπ , where 
>< 1,1
,iDN , 
>< 1,1
iN , and 
>< 1,1
iρ  are the number of direct 
visitors, the total number of visitors, and the traffic 
load of site i respectively,  BAi ,= . In the symmetric 
equilibrium outcome, the profit can be further 
expressed as  
( ) c
w
pbp
w
pbKawAKai ¹¸
·
©¨
§ −
−¹¸
·
©¨
§ −+−−+−=><
θ
θ
π
2
22))(1(
2
11,1 , 
BAi ,= .  
 
4. The impact of the RSS adoption 
 
Consider the two scenarios described below.  
(1) Initially, neither website have RSS. Website A 
adopts the RSS and becomes the first adopter of this 
new web technology. I call this the first adoption of 
the RSS.  
(2) One website has RSS already. Without loss of 
generality, I assume it is website A. Now website B 
also offers RSS feeds and becomes the second adopter. 
I call this the second adoption of the RSS.  
In this section, I use my results from section 3 to 
examine how a websites RSS adoption (the first and 
second adoption respectively) impacts the competition 
outcome. I focus on the non-degeneration case only, 
i.e., when conditions (12) and (18) hold.  
My findings are summarized in Table 1. I show 
that the first adoption of RSS increases the traffic load 
for both the adopter and its competitor; while the 
second adoption has no impact on either websites 
traffic load at all. It is because the channel competition 
always precedes the website competition. Potential 
visitors will first choose the visit channel (RSS or 
direct); given the channel choice, they choose a 
website to visit. So in visitors eyes, it does not matter 
which website or how many websites are offering the 
RSS feeds.   
As for the changes in the number of total and 
direct visitors, the results are intuitive. The first 
adoption of RSS increases the market size for both 
websites but the second adoption only increases the 
adopters market size. The RSS adoption, both first and 
second, always decreases (increases) the number of 
direct visitors of the adopting (competing) website. 
In this segment, there are 
)( 1,1 ><− xa  direct 
visitors: 1r  percent of 
them visit website A and  
11 r−  percent of them 
visit website B.   
 
Visitors value from 
browsing general 
content 
a>< 1,1x  0  
Figure 1(c). The competition with RSS 
In this segment, there are 
>< 1,1
RN  RSS visitors, among 
which 2r  percent visit 
website A and ( 21 r− ) 
percent visit website B. The 
rest ( ><><
−
1,11,1
RNx ) stay 
out of the market (do not 
visit the website).  
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        Table 1. Impacts of the RSS adoption  
 
(I) Impacts on the adopting website itself 
                  ρ            N           DN          π       
First 
adoption 
+ + - + or - 
Second 
adoption 
none + - + or - 
  
(I) Impacts on the competing website  
                    ρ            N          DN            π       
First 
adoption 
+ + + + or - 
Second 
adoption 
none none + + 
 
Note: The sign + indicates an increase and - indicates 
a decrease; and none indicates no change. 
 
When studying websites profit changes, I notice 
that there is no definite answer: the profit of the 
adopter and its competitor may increase or decrease. 
This interesting finding is investigated further. I 
identify the concrete conditions under which the profit 
will increase /decrease for each website. They are 
stated in Proposition 2.  
Proposition 2.  (1)The first RSS adoption will increase 
the adopting websites profit only if the sales income 
per visitor exceeds a threshold value *1P , i.e.,
*
1Pp ≥ ; 
otherwise, the profit of the adopting website decreases. 
On the other hand, the first RSS adoption may increase 
or decrease the competing websites profit. 
(2) The second RSS adoption will increase the 
adopting websites profit only if the sales income per 
visitor exceeds a threshold value *2P , i.e.,
*
2Pp ≥ .; 
otherwise, the profit of the adopting website decreases. 
On the other hand, the second RSS adoption will 
always increase the competing websites profit.  
The conclusion drawn here is interesting: in a 
competitive setting, adopting the RSS technology, no 
matter as the first mover or the second follower, may 
not be a profitable action. I identify two threshold 
values, *1P  and 
*
2P . Whether a websites RSS adoption 
behavior will benefit or hurt itself depends on whether 
the sales income per visitor exceeds the threshold 
value. In specific, I reveal the possibility that the RSS 
could decrease the adopters profit but increase its 
competitors profit (for example, when it is the second 
adoption and *2Pp < ). In such cases, the beneficiary 
of the new technology adoption is the websites 
competitor but not itself.  
The below corollary describes the special case 
0=p . It states that a website offering free content 
should not offer RSS no matter what the competitors 
choice is.  
Corollary 1. When 0=p , offering RSS feeds will 
always decrease the adopting websites profit but 
increase the competing websites profit, i.e., 
><><><>< >>> 0,11,10,00,1 AiiB ππππ , BAi ,= . 
 
5. The equilibrium in the adoption game 
 
In this section, I study the Nash equilibrium in a 
simultaneous RSS adoption game. Before presenting 
my main findings, I first derive the following Lemma. 
Lemma 2 There is a threshold value for the websites 
unit maintenance cost *c such that when *cc ≤ ,   
*
2
*
1 PP ≤  and when 
*cc > ,   *2
*
1 PP > .  
Recall that *1P  and 
*
2P  are the two critical values 
in Proposition 2. Lemma 2 determines their order. 
Using Lemma 2, now I can identify all the possible 
equilibriums. I use 0 to denote the strategy of not 
adopting, and 1 the strategy of adopting. Hence, the 
outcome (0,0) means no website adopts, (1,1) means 
both websites adopt, and (0,1) and (1,0) means one 
website adopts. 
Proposition 3.  Multiple types of equilibriums exist in 
the simultaneous adoption game, depending on two 
parameters, websites unit maintenance cost c and unit 
sales income p.  
(a) *cc ≤ ,    *1Pp ≤ : the unique equilibrium is (0,0).  
(b) *cc ≤ ,    *2
*
1 PpP <≤ : both (1,0) and (0,1) are 
equilibrium outcomes.  
(c) *cc ≤ ,    *2Pp ≥ : the unique equilibrium is (1,1).  
(d) *cc > ,    *2Pp ≤ : the unique equilibrium is (0,0).  
(e) *cc > ,    *1
*
2 PpP <≤ : both (0,0) and (1,1) are 
equilibrium outcomes.  
(f) *cc > ,    *1Pp ≥ : the unique equilibrium is (1,1). 
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Figure 2 shows these Nash equilibriums. Two 
important factors are identified.  The first is p . When 
p  increases, websites incentive to adopt the RSS 
increases. Under a large value of p , it is more likely to 
get the (1,1) equilibrium, namely, both website adopts; 
while under a small value of p , the (0,0) equilibrium, 
namely, none adopts, should be expected. This finding 
could be applied to the practice. For example, consider 
weblog sites, where the RSS originally rooted from. 
RSS naturally becomes the major tool for these sites to 
distribute contents because of their narrow information 
coverage and unstable update periods. However, my 
finding here shows that from the economic perspective, 
weblogs should not adopt RSS. These sites usually 
provide free content and hence are likely to lie in the 
category of low sales income, regions (a) or (d) in 
Figure 2. Offering RSS feeds will lead to a profit 
reduction for them. This conclusion is consistent with 
current online practice that there is an increasing 
number of complaints from weblogs that their RSS 
feeds attract too much traffic load and make it difficult 
to monetize the sites. The reason that weblogs 
currently still take a significant RSS provision 
percentage is that most of these sites do not take 
profitability as their major goal. Another example is e-
commerce website, which are likely to be in the 
regions of high sales income, (c) and (f). These sites 
gain revenue mainly from selling commodities or 
providing online services to visitors. To them, more 
visitors mean greater profitability. Although the RSS 
has only been recognized by the e-commerce sites in 
the recent years, the finding here predicts that the wide 
adoption of the RSS technology by e-commerce sites 
will be put in practice soon. 
The second factor that affects the equilibrium type 
is the unit maintenance cost c .  
As c  increases, websites incentive to adopt RSS 
reduces. It is more likely to see the none-adoption 
equilibrium (0,0) to appear. The underlying reason is 
that the RSS will always bring websites more traffic, 
leading to higher total maintenance costs. So a large 
c potentially becomes an obstacle for the RSS 
adoption. On the other hand, as c decreases, the two 
competing websites could show differentiations in their 
adoption strategies. Single-adoption, (1,0) or (0,1), 
becomes a possible equilibrium outcome only if c  
drops below the certain level *c . This finding predicts 
that as the technology keeps improving to reduce the 
unit maintenance cost we would expect to see websites 
become more diversified in the RSS adoption decision.  
Corollary 2 When 0=p ,  the Nash equilibrium is 
always (0,0). 
This corollary directly follows from Proposition 3.   
 
6. Adding advertisements to RSS feeds  
 
In this session, I examine the effects of adding 
advertisements into RSS feeds. When RSS visitors also 
contribute to the website advertisement revenue, how 
would my major results change?  
So far, my analyses are under the assumption that 
the RSS is able to block online advertisements and so 
RSS visitors do not bear the anti-advertising costs adC  
as direct visitors do. The consequences are: first, 
potential visitors have strong incentive to use the RSS 
channel since the decision of using the RSS or not is 
determined by whether the cost savings ( K ) from the 
RSS is large enough; second, websites profit is 
reduced since RSS visitors do not contribute to the 
advertising revenue, which causes severe problems 
especially for websites which are largely monetized by 
advertisements. If I remove this assumption, it means 
that RSS visitors will also be exposed to a certain 
amount of advertisements and they could contribute to 
the advertising revenue by a factor 10 ≤≤ δ , where 
0=δ  is the case that all advertisements are blocked 
by RSS and 1=δ  is the extreme case that the RSS 
cannot block any advertisements.  After redoing all 
the analyses, I find that the only change of my results 
is that now the expression of cost savings from RSS 
need be revised as adCSK )1( δ−+= . Once this 
revision is done, all other solutions and equations 
remain the same. So are lemmas and propositions.  
In addition, the new analysis enables me to derive 
the largest quantity of advertisements that could be 
added into the RSS feeds. Consider the non-
degeneration conditions obtained in the paper, i.e., 
inequalities (12) and (18) for cases <1,0> and <1,1> 
respectively. Because the total saving K  reduces after 
adding advertisements, the left parts of these 
(1) unit maintenance cost is low: *cc <   
*
1P  *2P  
*
1P  *2P  
    
p
Region a.  
(0,0) 
Region b.  
(1,0) or (0,1) 
Region c. 
(1,1) 
Region d. (0,0) 
Region e.     
(0,0) or 
(1,1) 
Region f.  
(1,1) 
Figure 2: The RSS adoption equilibriums 
(2) unit maintenance cost is high: *cc ≥   
    
p
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inequalities become smaller while the right parts keep 
unchanged. So these inequalities are more likely to be 
violated. Degeneration is more likely to happen when 
more advertisements are added into the RSS. Studying 
the binding conditions of these inequalities, I obtain an 
upper bound of δ , denoted by *δ , meaning that if too 
many advertisements are added into the RSS feeds, 
beyond this upper bound, no potential visitors will use 
the RSS, i.e., degeneration happens. For each case, 
such upper bound value is derived.  
Proposition 4. Advertisement could be added to the 
RSS but with an upper limit on its quantity. The 
maximum amount of advertisements, denoted by 
*δ , is given below. If it is exceeded, no visitors will 
use the RSS program to visit the website.   
°°¯
°°®
­
><
+
−++−
><
+
−++−
=
1,1
)2(
)(22
0,1
)1(
)(
*
Case
Cw
aCSwpb
Case
Cwr
aCSwrpb
ad
ad
ad
ad
δ  
To read this result, note that an average direct 
visitor will read one unit of online advertisement. 
Proposition 4 states that for a website that is competing 
with another website without RSS, it should load no 
more than 
ad
ad
Cwr
aCSwrpb
)1(
)(
+
−++−  unit of 
advisements into its RSS feeds. This upper bound 
becomes 
ad
ad
Cw
aCSwpb
)2(
)(22
+
−++−  for a website 
that is competing with another website with RSS. 
These numbers could provide useful guidance for 
website decision makers at a qualitative level. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper I propose a model to study the 
profitability and competitive (dis)advantage of the RSS 
adoption for websites. The model looks at the website 
with revenue coming from two sources: advertising 
and providing online products/services. Meanwhile, the 
website bears maintenance costs which are increasing 
in the total traffic load on the site. The online 
information offered by the website is valuable to 
potential visitors. However, visitors willingness-to-
pay for accessing such information is heterogeneous 
across the whole population. The conventional way of 
the website visit imposes various types of costs on the 
visitor, including searching, anti-advertising, and 
traffic costs. On the other hand, if the visitor could use 
the RSS to access the online information, it can be 
relieved of some of these costs. My study finds several 
interesting results and offers insightful practical 
implications. They are briefly discussed below. 
First of all, I identify the situations when higher 
traffic load brought on by the RSS is accompanied by 
lower profit. This could happen when the revenue 
increments from the higher traffic load are not enough 
to offset the maintenance cost increases. More 
interestingly, I find that the RSS adoption of one 
website could improve its competitors profit but 
reduce the profit of itself. This is because direct 
visitors are, in general, more profitable customers than 
RSS visitors due to their larger contribution to the 
sites revenue. When a website opens the RSS channel 
and attracts a large amount of RSS visitors, it results in 
high traffic load and drives direct visitors away to the 
competitor, which in turn benefits the competing 
website. I derive the conditions under which it will 
happen, and suggest that in such a case, the beneficiary 
of the new technology adoption is not the adopter but 
its competitor. So the RSS adoption constitutes a 
competition disadvantage, rather than advantage. This 
important finding offers explanations to the recent 
complaints from some websites that after offering RSS 
feeds they have difficulty to handle the heavy traffic 
and are not able to monetize their sites ([1]). It also 
gives out some warnings to websites that are 
considering RSS adoptions. The RSS is not a costless 
content-delivery mechanism. A careful cost-and-
benefit analysis is needed when making the adoption 
decision. Certain types of websites, for example, 
websites who offer free online content (such as 
weblogs) or whose revenue is mainly from advertising 
(such as new portals) should not offer the RSS feeds. 
To them, the RSS use, though facilitating the 
information delivery to visitors, cannot be justified 
from an economics point of view.  
In studying the simultaneous adoption game for 
two competing websites, I find that three types of 
adoption outcome, namely, both websites adopt, one 
website adopts only, and none adopts, may appear 
depending on two key parameters: the expected sales 
income per visitor ( p ) and the unit website 
maintenance cost ( c ). In specific, the equilibrium 
both adopt is more likely to appear as p  increases 
or as c  decreases; while the equilibrium no website 
adopts is more likely to appear as p  decreases or as 
c  increases. These results could be applied to the 
reality for analyzing the future trend of RSS adoptions. 
For example, the finding that websites tend to adopt 
RSS under a higher value of p  suggests that e-
commerce websites benefit from the RSS use to a large 
extent. A large proportion of the revenue of e-
commerce websites is from selling commodities or 
providing online services to their visitors. They earn 
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high unit sales income per visitor. Although the RSS 
has only been recognized by these sites recently, my 
analysis here predicts the wide adoption of the RSS 
technology by e-commerce sites in the near future.  
 
References  
      
[1] Aughton, S., "Google turns to RSS news feeds for  
Placing ads," PC PRO, April 2005 
 
[2] Bettman, J. R., Johnson, E. J., and Payne, J. W., A 
Componential Analysis of Cognitive Effort in Choice, 
Organization Behavior and Human Performance, 45 
(1), 111-39, 1990 
  
[3] Davis, W., Two of Three Online Mags Have Web-
Only Advertisers, Online Media Daily, June 2005. The 
article is available  at 
http://publications.mediapost.com/index.cfm?fuse 
action=Articles.san&s=31662&Nid=14155&p=276816  
 
[4] Dewan, R., and Freimer, M., "Consumers prefer 
bundled add-ins," Journal of Management Information 
Systems, Volume 20, No. 3, Winter 2003-04. 
 
[5] Dewan, R.M., Freimer, M.L. and Zhang, J. 
Management and valuation of Advertisement-
Supported Web Sites, Journal of Management 
Information Systems 19 (3), pp. 8798., 2002 
 
[6] Dewan, R., Jing, R., and Seidmann, A., "Product 
Customization and Price Competition on the Internet," 
Management Science, Vol. 49, No. 8, pp. 1055-1070, 
August 2003 
 
[7] Hoque, A. Y., and Lohse, G. L., (1999), An 
Information Search Cost Perspective for Designing 
Interfaces for Electronic Commerce, Journal of 
Marketing Research, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 387-394, 
Aug., 1999 
 
[8] Hrastnik, R., 2005, "Unleash the Marketing & 
Publishing Power of RSS" 
 
[9] Milgrom, P., and Roberts, J., Price and 
Advertising Signals of Product Quality, The Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol., 94, No. 4, pp. 796-821, 
Aug., 1986 
 
[10] Morrissey, B., "RSS Feeds Becoming Hot Real 
Estate For Online Ads," Adweek report, June 2005 
 
[11] Ruebeck, C. S., Interfirm Competition versus 
Intrafirm Cannibalization in the Computer Hard Disk 
Drive Industry, Review of Industrial Organization, 
Volume 26, Number 1 / February, 2005 
  
[12] Shaked, A., Sutton, J. Multiproduct Firms and 
Market Structure," RAND Journal of Economics 21: 
45-62, 1990 
 
[13] Shugan, S. M., The Cost of Thinking, Journal of 
Consumer Research, 7 (2), 99-111, 1980 
 
[14] The New York Times Company, "CORRECTING 
and REPLACING The New York Times Company 
Reports NYTimes.com's Record-Breaking Traffic for 
March," The New York Times Company News Release 
- April 18, 2006 
 
Proceedings of the 42nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 2009
10
